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Abstract
This paper analyzes the geographic dispersion of employment restructuring in multinational
enterprises, where we distinguish between headquarters and geographically dispersed affili-
ates. To this end, we use data of 255 Belgian parents and 1,887 affiliates between 1996 and
2005. We show that for multinational enterprises that restructure headquarters have superior
employment performance than their affiliates. This effect seems to be stronger for vertically
integrated firms, which is consistent with theories of imperfect information and increased
agency costs. We also show that proximity matters: restructuring hurts the most the further
the affiliate is located from the headquarter. This effect is consistent with the monitoring
difficulties that are associated with vertical FDI firms and with the role of social network effects.
Keywords: employment growth, multinational enterprises, headquarters, affiliates, vertical
FDI
JEL Classification Numbers: F23, L25, M51, O32
1 Introduction
Globalization has changed the nature of production drastically, resulting in an increased number
of global firms and increased international fragmentation of production. While much of the
literature so far has documented that multinational enterprises tend to pay higher wages, are more
productive and generate technological spillovers, far less attention has been devoted to the process
of employment creation and destruction by multinationals1. Yet, the recent global crisis has shown
the importance of the internationalization of the production process in spreading and amplifying
economic shocks throughout the world. The purpose of this paper therefore is to analyze whether
geographically dispersed firms, like multinationals, transmit economic shocks in a similar fashion
across their locations, in particular their affiliates and headquarter. Casual observation suggests
that such restructuring efforts are not always proportionately distributed across all plants of the
∗This paper benefited from presentations at the LETC Conference in Ljubljana (FREIT), the CAED-COST
Conference at Imperial College, London and the Eastern Economic Association Conference in New York. We thank
Francine Lafontaine and Dieter Urban for useful comments and suggestions.
†CES, Centre for Economic Studies
‡VIVES Centre for Regional Economic Policy, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance
§CES, Centre for Economic Studies, VIVES Centre for Regional Economic Policy, LICOS Centre for Institutions
and Economic Performance-KU Leuven
1A number of papers have analyzed how employment is substituted between affiliates of the same multinational
in response to wage cost differentials. Braconier and Ekholm (2000), Hanson, Mataloni Jr, and Slaughter (2001) and
Konings and Murphy (2006) find that employment substitution in response to wage cost differentials between plants
occurs mainly between similar plants, located in high income countries, rather than between high income and low
income countries.
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same multinational enterprise. For instance the recent restructuring of Opel at General Motors
implied closure of one plant in Belgium, employment reductions in Germany, but creation of jobs
in South Korea. Politicians are also concerned about possible asymmetric responses to shocks by
MNEs, as is clear from a recent interview with Lord Mandelson in the Wall Street Journal2 where
he states that ‘Denuding a country of any headquarters has important consequences, especially for
the associated investment in local charities and infrastructures’.
The observation that geographically dispersed firms transmit shocks differently across plants
has recently been investigated for the US by Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009). In particular, they
find that geographically dispersed firms are less employee friendly and that there is a bias towards
protecting proximate employees when the firm engages in divestments. Similarly, Cappariello,
Federico, and Zizza (2009) use Italian multinational enterprises to show that home-country effects
of FDI tend to be biased in favor of the headquarters investing firms. Dischinger and Riedel (2009)
focus on the profitability gap in European MNEs and find that headquarters are around 25% more
profitable. Also, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2010) find for the American lodging industry that affiliates
which are located further away from their headquarters have lower revenue. There are various
reasons why geographic dispersion and corporate decision making might be related. First, imperfect
information and agency costs may result in a home bias. In particular, if monitoring and control of
valuable assets, such as R&D, is difficult, multinational enterprises may want to concentrate their
most valuable assets at, or close to, headquarters to avoid ‘leakage’ (e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999;
Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Such cost considerations are more likely to be important when MNEs
engage more in vertical FDI, i.e. when firms locate part of their activities in other countries because
of lower production costs. Second, there may be certain advantages investing more at home due to
better knowledge about language, culture and local customs than at more distant locations (e.g.
Brakman and Garretsen, 2008). This would be important when MNEs main motivation for investing
is related to horizontal FDI, i.e. they invest to access the market of foreign consumers and exploit
the market size abroad. A third reason is that managers are more concerned about proximate
employees, with whom they have more frequent social interactions. In addition, managers may also
care more about their social standing in geographically concentrated firms. Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman (1996) find a relation between proximity and social network effects in studies of
individual decisions, such as residence in cities, and aggregate outcomes, such as crimes.
To analyze employment performance of multinational enterprises we make use of a panel dataset
of Belgian firms active in manufacturing as well as in non-manufacturing. The data include
information on total employment at headquarters as well as employment at their affiliates. By
analyzing what happens within the same multinational firm, we can control for all the unobservable
specificities that may affect the strategy of the particular multinational enterprises. Furthermore, we
control for shocks affecting plants of the same multinational enterprise. This allows us to control for
potential selection issues. As we have information on the industry in which each firm operates, we
are able to make a distinction between horizontal and vertical measures of FDI. This will help us to
explore some of the reasons of why headquarters might behave differently than their affiliates. Our
results indicate that the employment performance at headquarters is superior than at their affiliates.
Furthermore, we find that multinational enterprises that engage in restructuring protect more the
employment at headquarters than at their affiliates. We present evidence which suggests that this
effect is largely due to increased agency costs for vertical FDI. We also find that restructuring hurts
most in more distant locations. This result is both in line with the monitoring difficulties vertically
integrated firms face and the role of social network effects. The rest of the paper is structured
as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and the econometric approach we pursue. Section 3
discusses the results. We first present our basic results on the superior employment performance at
headquarters; then we continue by providing explanations that could drive these effects. We also
present some additional robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Econometric Approach
Our data are derived from a commercial database named Amadeus, collected by Bureau van Dijk.
The data consists of company accounts of European companies for which at least one of the following
2Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2010, page 2.
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criteria is satisfied: total turnover or assets of at least $12 million, or total employment of at least
150. The database is organized by country with records for firms within each country. In addition
to the financial and operational information of the company, the records include information on
whether the company is owned by another company and whether it has an ownership stake in
another affiliate. Information on direct and on indirect ownership is available. In addition, the
name and a unique identification number of the parent company and its affiliates is available.
We will restrict our analysis to companies which have headquarters in Belgium and affiliates
elsewhere in Europe. We focus on Belgian multinational enterprises as all incorporated companies
in Belgium are required, by law, to submit full company accounts to the Central Bank. Following
the IFRS standards, we define a headquarter as a global ultimate owner with at least 50.01%
direct ownership in its affiliates. We have information for 1996 through 2005 and we retrieve all
companies for which unconsolidated accounts were available for the Belgian parent headquarters
and its affiliates located elsewhere in Europe.
Matching parent companies to foreign affiliates yields an unbalanced panel of 255 Belgian
parents and 1,887 affiliates over 10 years. This results in roughly 13,000 firm-year observations.
The ownership information we use is based on one edition of Amadeus only. By using a fixed time
point, we assume that the ownership structure has remained the same in the other years as well.
One could look at earlier editions of Amadeus in order to pick up changes in ownership percentages
or structure. However, as the coverage of Amadeus in the past was less complete than more recent
editions, it becomes unclear whether a missing observation is due to a non-existing link between
the owner and the affiliate or to some coverage issues3. For instance, of the 1,382 affiliates that
were already active in 19964, only 376 firms were covered in the 1997 version. Turning to the 2001
edition, we see an improvement in the coverage level: 1,675 affiliates in our sample were active
in 2000. Of these firms, we were able to retrieve 89% or 1,499 firms. Linking these firms with
their ownership structure, we were able to match 509 firms successfully with the id of their owner,
observing some changes in ownership5. Missing data would mean that either the information was
not disclosed or that the firm is considered to be independent. We will keep these observations in
our sample. However, firms that had a different ultimate owner prior to 2001 will be omitted from
our sample. We will also perform an additional robustness check using only the subsample of firms
which reported the same ultimate owner of 2007 in the 2001 version of Amadeus.
Table 1: Distribution of Affiliates
Country Observations Frequency Country Observations Frequency
Austria 24 1.29 Hungary 5 0.27
Belgium 864 46.35 Ireland 11 0.59
Bulgaria 1 0.05 Italy 45 2.41
Suisse 19 1.02 Lithuania 1 0.05
Czech Republic 21 1.13 Luxemburg 2 0.11
Germany 141 7.56 Netherlands 136 7.3
Denmark 19 1.02 Norway 12 0.64
Estonia 1 0.05 Poland 19 1.02
Spain 61 3.27 Portugal 2 0.11
Finland 7 0.38 Romania 19 1.02
France 299 16.04 Republic of Serbia 1 0.05
United Kingdom 114 6.12 Russia 2 0.11
Greece 8 0.43 Sweden 26 1.39
Croatia 2 0.11 Slovakia 2 0.11
Source: Amadeus BvD
3Detailed ownership information started to be available from the Amadeus 2001 version.
4We obtain the number of active firms by looking at the incorporation date of the firm, which is also available
from Amadeus.
5We were able to identify 92 affiliates that had a different owner in the 2001 edition and 417 that reported the
same owner.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variables Headquarters Affiliates Total
Employment Mean 291.347 139.532 149.74
Std. Dev. 1.094.218 1.120.075 1.087.206
Employment growth Mean 0.047 0.032 0.034
Std. Dev. 0.34 0.443 0.428
Total assets Mean 130,817 89,771 90,334
Std. Dev. 507,725 1,727,842 1,594,836
Sales Mean 90,334 38,369 46,684
Std. Dev. 332,922 260,273 273,852
Pct Intangible assets in group Mean 0.545 0.096 0.146
Std. Dev. 0.449 0.244 0.309
Pct Total assets in group Mean 0.622 0.1 0.168
Std. Dev. 0.389 0.204 0.294
Notes: Total assets & sales in thousand of euros
Table 1 shows the final country distribution of affiliates in our panel, where each parent has
an average of 9 affiliates. The parents are clustered around some of the major cities in Belgium,
being Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent, and their foreign affiliates are mainly located in France, the
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. We provide summary statistics in table 2, where
the variable of interest is employment. Headquarters employ on average more people, have more
sales, higher total assets and have a higher average employment growth than their affiliates. In
addition, we look at some proxies for the R&D and capital intensity in the firm: the intangible
and tangible fixed assets. The share of a firms’s tangible and intangible fixed assets in the total of
tangibles and intangibles for its group is higher if that firm is a headquarter. The data cover firms
active in manufacturing and non-manufacturing. Further statistics on the distribution of industries
can be found in table 3. Note that about 30% of all firms in our sample are active in manufacturing.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Affiliates Headquarters Total
Non-Manufacturing 1,322 (71%) 173 (68%) 1,495 (71%)
Manufacturing 542 (29%) 80 (32%) 622 (29%)
Total 1,864 253 2,117
Source: Amadeus BvD
To analyze the evolution of employment in multinational headquarters relative to their affiliates
we will use a standard firm level employment growth equation. We use the information available in
Amadeus on the group structure of firms by taking into account that various affiliates may belong
to the same multinational enterprise. By controlling for multinational fixed effects we are able to
capture various unobservable factors, such as similar technology or management practices that
are shared by the same MNE across its affiliates. It also controls for unobservable self-selection
effects. Additionally, we control for sectoral sales and productivity growth, defined at the 2 digit
NACE level. We do this to control for exogenous shocks in demand and technology6. To estimate
whether headquarters behave differently in terms of their employment decisions we control in our
specification for a headquarter dummy, HQ, equal to 1 if the firm is a headquarter and zero else.
This results in the following specification for firm i, belonging to MNE j and sector ss in year t,
located in country c and n denoting log employment:
n
jcs
it = ρn
jcs
it−1 + β1HQ+ β2X
s
t + γj + ǫ
jc
it
6This information is obtained from the EU KLEMS database.
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We take into account that firm level employment is persistent over time by adding the lagged
logarithm of employment. ǫ is a white noise error term. When we subtract lagged employment
from both sides, the equation boils down to estimating a standard firm level employment growth
equation, controlling for lagged size. This will form the basis of our analysis7. Headquarters might
have a different labor composition than their affiliates, which could explain potential differences
in employment performance. By looking at a subsample of manufacturing headquarters, we aim
to exclude those headquarters which have a purely administrative function. Also, using industry
information at the firm level, we will distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI. We run some
additional tests in which we further explore the effect of distance on performance. We include
a dummy for Belgian firms and introduce the distance between headquarter and affiliates in our
analysis, using information at the country level. To check for asymmetric responses in employment
growth we split the sample of firms in a subsample of multinational enterprises with expanding
employment and a subsample of companies that are restructuring. A multinational company is
expanding if the combined employment of the affiliates and the headquarter increased on average in
the period 1996-2005. The multinational enterprise is considered to be restructuring if the reverse
holds. As a robustness check, we will consider a different definition of restructuring using annual
employment growth instead of a ten year average. All equations include year dummies and standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity within the same multinational enterprise (Moulton, 1990).
3 Results
3.1 Basic Results
Table 4 and 5 report the baseline results. In the former we consider expanding multinationals and
in the latter multinationals with declining employment. Column (1) pools both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing headquarters together; the following two columns include the productivity and
sales growth controls. Column (4) reports the estimations for the subsample of non-manufacturing
headquarters and their affiliates. Note that we place no constraint on the activity of the daughter
firms. Column (7), both in table 4 and 5, concludes with the results of the manufacturing head-
quarters and affiliates. The regression coefficient on the headquarter dummy for these specifications
reports one of the main findings of this paper: employment growth in headquarters is on average
higher than in its corresponding affiliates. We find some evidence that the coefficient of the
headquarter dummy is larger for the restructuring companies as for the expanding multinationals8.
In other words, affiliates might suffer more than headquarters offices from job cuts that are taking
place in restructuring companies. In contrast, when there is expansion, the increase in employment
will be more moderate at headquarters. Our results indicate that the headquarter employment
effect is driven by manufacturing MNEs. In contrast, the headquarter effect for non-manufacturing
firms is small and statistically not significant different from zero. We also observe that large firms
on average grow less than small firms. This is a standard result in the firm growth literature, which
will hold in the following specifications.
3.2 Analysing Restructuring MNEs
In this section we turn to some of the theories that can explain these results, focusing on restructuring
MNEs. We start by exploring the possible role of horizontal versus vertical FDI. In horizontally
integrated firms, investments and activities in the parent location might be more profitable as
multinationals have advantages in their home market regarding local customs and culture (Brakman
and Garretsen, 2008). Vertically integrated firms, however, face increased agency costs when their
valuable assets are located within geographically separated affiliates. This may prove difficult
to monitor. (e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). In order to avoid these
costs, MNEs may wish to concentrate their most valuable functions close to their headquarter. We
explore the effect of horizontal and vertical FDI by creating a subsample of affiliates that have
7Similar approaches have been used in the firm growth literature. See for instance Sutton (1997) and Konings
(1995).
8Pooling expanding and restructuring manufacturing MNEs, we find that the additional headquarter effect for
restructuring MNEs is positive with a p-value between 0.10 and 0.20.
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the same industry classification as their headquarter (Horizontal FDI) and one where the affiliates
are active in a different sector than their parent firm (Vertical FDI). This identification is based
on the 4 digit NACE industry classification. Table 6 summarizes the results for the horizontally
integrated firms. Although the coefficients remain positive, we do not see a significant effect of the
headquarter dummy variable in any of our specifications. Turning to the vertically integrated firms
in table 7, however, we see a confirmation of our earlier findings: the results seem to be driven
largely by manufacturing MNEs and the coefficient of the headquarter dummy remains positive and
significant. In order to fully identify the importance of the agency costs associated with vertical
FDI, we run some additional tests. First, we include the percentage of intangible fixed assets each
firm represents within the multinational. This balance sheet item contains e.g. goodwill and R&D
investments, which is why we use it as a proxy for the more valuable assets of a company.
Table 8 gives an overview of our findings. In column (1) we only include the IFA variable,
effectively dropping the headquarter dummy. Firms that have more intangibles than the other
firms in the MNE have a superior employment performance. Including the headquarter dummy in
columns (2), (3) and (4), this effect does not disappear. Moreover, the headquarter effect is weaker
than in our earlier specifications and does not become significant. Note that on average 54% of
the multinational’s intangible assets are concentrated in the headquarter. We add one additional
check in table 9. We use the same subsample as in table 8 with the same definition of restructuring,
but exclude the parent firms of the multinational from our specifications. The IFA variable has
increased in size and remains significant, giving evidence to the notion that multinationals protect
the more valuable functions and assets within their company.
In a second test we investigate the role of distance. This could play a role when agency costs
matter, as multinationals need to monitor their assets, but might be equally important regarding
social network effects: fear for reputational loss and social standing might induce managers to
protect employees closer to them, i.e. closer to the parent firm (e.g. Landier, Nair, and Wulf,
2009). We include the logarithm of distance to our estimation equation9. Table 10 summarizes: the
headquarter effect disappears, but we gain a negative and significant coefficient on the distance
variable. We find this result for all our manufacturing and pooled industry specifications. Here,
restructuring hurts the most the further the affiliate is geographically located from its parent firm.
The fact that we no longer pick up an effect for the parent firms can be explained by the correlation
between distance and headquarters, as all headquarters are situated within Belgium. In a final
check, we reconsider the effect of proximity by making a distinction between affiliates located in
the same country as the headquarter, Belgium, versus affiliates abroad. About 50% of the affiliates
in our sample are located in Belgium. The institutional setting of those affiliates is the same and
the distance to their headquarters may be equally important when agency costs matter. Table 11
presents the results where, in addition to a headquarter dummy, we also include a dummy equal to
1 if the affiliate is based in Belgium and zero else. Looking at columns (7), (8) and (9), we find that
the effect is similar to the effect of distance. In particular, we find that in addition to a positive
headquarter effect, affiliates that are located in the same country as the headquarter suffer less
from restructuring. This is again consistent with theories that indicate that geographic dispersion
and proximity to headquarters matters for employment restructuring.
3.3 Robustness Checks
The results in table 4 and table 5 were based on an unbalanced panel of Belgian MNEs. Some firms
are only observed for a few consecutive years, while data for the other companies are available for
the full sample period. The attrition in the data is mostly related to missing observations due to
differences in reporting requirements across countries. To check whether this attrition would bias
our results we run the same regression for a balanced panel for which we observed data for the full
10 year sample period. This, in turn, means that we are neglecting new startups or closures in the
multinational and lowers our number of observations considerably. We report these results in table
12 and table 13. While the overall headquarter dummy remains positive for restructuring MNEs, it
is only statistically significant for the pooled sample. Looking at the subsample of manufacturing
headquarters, the significance of the headquarter coefficient drops: we obtain a p-value of about
9Note that the average distance of affiliates to their headquarters is 500 km and that we use distances calculated
on the country level.
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Table 8: MNE Restructuring: Manufacturing HQ only-Including IFA
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Employees t-1 -0.0390** -0.0397** -0.0416** -0.0407**
(0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0174)
IFA/ Total IFA Group 0.119* 0.110* 0.111* 0.117**
(0.0586) (0.0542) (0.0541) (0.0528)
Headquarter Dummy 0.0140 0.0159 0.00597
(0.0507) (0.0532) (0.0512)
Productivity Growth 0.938**
(0.386)
Sales Growth -0.909
(0.617)
Constant 0.223** 0.160** 0.236** 0.277**
(0.0769) (0.0672) (0.0904) (0.0996)
Observations 656 656 635 635
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE group clusters in parentheses.
Firm fixed effects and year dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, *** reports
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 9: MNE Restructuring: Subsample Affiliates of Manufacturing HQ-Including IFA
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth (1) (2) (3)
Log Employees t-1 -0.429*** -0.437*** -0.438***
(0.0849) (0.0931) (0.0903)
IFA/ Total IFA Group 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.233***
(0.0681) (0.0684) (0.0728)
Productivity Growth 0.536
(0.747)
Sales Growth -1.522
-2.077
Constant 1.518*** 1.533*** 1.613***
(0.322) (0.339) (0.337)
Observations 578 557 557
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE group clusters
in parentheses. Firm fixed effects and year dummies are included in all
regressions. *, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
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0.15. We do not pick up any effect for the expanding MNEs, which reconfirms our belief that
multinationals transmit shocks differently in times of restructuring than when they choose to expand
operations.
In a second test, we experiment with our definition of restructuring: instead of using the average
growth rate of the period 1996-2005, we look at the yearly growth rate of the MNE. If this is
negative, we consider the multinational to be restructuring. Results are presented in table 14. It
confirms the earlier findings of table 5: headquarters experience superior employment growth in
restructuring manufacturing MNE, but our obtained coefficients are smaller. In a final check we
consider the ownership structure of the multinational. As our ownership information is collected at
a fixed point in time, it is unclear whether certain firms were always part of the multinational in
the past, or joined more recently. We redefine the multinational by using a subsample of affiliates
that reported the same global ultimate owner in 2007 as in 2001. We choose this reference point
as earlier copies of Amadeus have a considerably lower coverage level and contain less detailed
ownership information. Due to a decrease in our sample size, we are only able to report the results
for the manufacturing multinationals. Restructuring is again defined using the average growth rate
in the period 1996-2007. The results are presented in table 15. We note an increased coefficient on
the headquarter dummy, which has remained positive and significant in all specifications.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzed employment growth in multinational enterprises, where we distinguished
between employment growth in headquarters versus employment growth in their affiliates. To this
end we used a panel data set of Belgian income statements of headquarter firms matched to their
affiliates. By analyzing what happens within the same multinational firm, we can control for all the
unobservable specificities that may affect the strategy of the particular multinational enterprises.
Furthermore, we are able to control for shocks affecting plants of the same multinational enterprise
and hence this allowed us to control for potential selection issues. Our results indicate that the
employment performance at headquarters is better compared to their affiliates and that this is
more likely for restructuring MNEs. Looking into the possible reasons of this effect, we find that
these results are stronger within vertically integrated firms. This is consistent with the theories
of imperfect information and agency costs: as MNEs find it more difficult to monitor their most
valuable assets and functions, they may choose to locate these at or close to the headquarter.
Concerning the effect of proximity, we find evidence that restructuring hurts most in affiliates
located further away from their headquarters. This is again in line with the theory on agency costs,
but is also consistent with the theories that focus on social capital and social interactions to explain
the home bias for employment.
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Table 15: MNE Restructuring: Subsample Affiliates of Manufacturing HQ-Including IFA
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth (1) (2) (3)
Log Employees t-1 -0.0678*** -0.0675*** -0.0695***
(0.0163) (0.0132) (0.0112)
Headquarter Dummy 0.211** 0.211** 0.212**
(0.0659) (0.0620) (0.0652)
Productivity Growth -0.226
-1.443
Sales Growth -0.680
-2.320
Constant 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.318**
(0.0493) (0.0519) (0.0811)
Observations 375 358 358
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE group clusters
in parentheses. Firm fixed effects and year dummies are included in all
regressions. *, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
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